



Bridging the gap: Contributions of academics and national security practitioners to counterterrorism in Indonesia

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ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:

Terrorism
Cooperation
Collaboration
Coordination
Contribution
Academics
Practitioners

ABSTRACT

The revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia stimulates ongoing discussions about collaboration of all instruments of counterterrorism, coordination, and the important role of both academics and practitioners in the field. This study aims to identify variety of contributions of academics and national security practitioners to counterterrorism in Indonesia. Participants from government agencies and universities working on terrorism were involved in the study. Moreover, the study administered systematic review and qualitative text analysis to documents of CVE (Counter Violent Extremism). The findings demonstrate that there are fifteen aspects addressed in counterterrorism in which academics and practitioners are working simultaneously. Moreover, there are similarities and differences of contributions by academics and national security practitioners in each of these fifteen aspects of counterterrorism.

1. Introduction

The Mako Brimob prison riot of 2018 which demonstrated hostage drama and riot by terrorist offenders in a detention centre followed by the emergence of family suicide bombings, accelerated the enactment of the revised Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia (Gumelar, 2018; Nabbs-Keller, 2018; Wamad, 2018). The revision of the law was urgently proposed as it is seen to include issues, which have not been stated in the previous law. Bambang Soesatyo, Chairman of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, said that the upgrade lies at the issues such as compensation for bombing victims, deradicalisation, arrest prior to terror act, protection for counterterrorism practitioners, pre-trial detention, the legitimate role of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) as a leading body in Indonesian counterterrorism, and monitoring system for BNPT (Mukhtar, 2018). The same explanation was stated by Sukabdi (in Malau, 2020), a forensic psychologist who conducts researches on terrorism in Indonesia. In the same year after the Mako Brimob incident, Indonesia approved the Anti-Terrorism Bill into Law No. 5/2018, after continuous debates amongst several elements in counterterrorism (i.e. the various political parties represented in the legislative, the executive, women's organisations, national security practitioners from several agencies, academics, religious groups, Human Rights activists, and civil society organisations) (Asmawi et al., 2019; Bawulele, 2019; Karolina, 2019; Lolong and Rusdiana, 2018; Nabbs-Keller, 2018). The debates were over controversial subjects in the law, for example, the definition of the word "terrorism" (Aljazeera News, 2018; Santoso, 2013) and the affirmation of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI)/military's role in counterterrorism (Nabbs-Keller, 2018; Syailendra, 2018).

After the enactment of Law No. May 2018 on terrorism, several academics proposed a Judicial Review (JR) to the law particularly related to the definition of "terrorism" (Mardatillah, 2018). The definition, according to these academics, was seen as not specifying the

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word “*radical*” and not explicitly stating that terrorism is against Pancasila, the Indonesian Constitution. Moreover, these academics of legal studies proposed an examination on Article 1 (1); Article 43A (3) (b) Part III; Article 43C (1), (3), and (4); Article 43F (c); and Article 43G (a) of the law which according to them were against the supreme law of Indonesia, known as Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 45) (Mardatillah, 2018). The Constitutional Court examined these academics’ proposal on July 11, 2018, two months after the enactment. In October 2018, the judges of the Constitutional Court finally decided to reject the proposal with two bases of reasons: that the law does not directly impact the proposing academics (CNN Indonesia, 2018). The tension and debates are not over after the decision of the Constitutional Court on October 2018. The Law No. May 2018 on terrorism needs a follow up or operational regulations made by the executive, known as Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) and Peraturan Presiden (Perpres), according to Bambang Soesatyo, Chairman of the House of Representatives (Mukhtar, 2018). The Head of Anti-Terrorism Law Special Committee in the Indonesian legislative, Muhammad Syafii, explained that there are derivatives needed to be produced a hundred days after the enactment, which are PPs and Perpres (Septianto, 2018). The Perpres he mentioned was regarding a controversial issue: the involvement of military in counterterrorism, stated in the revision of the law (Nabbs-Keller, 2018; Septianto, 2018). Many of the elements of society in Indonesia included academics and practitioners discussing the issue, reviewing the pros and cons of the Perpres as well as coordination issues amongst agencies of counterterrorism (Riana, 2020; Swartzendruber, 2018; Syailendra, 2018). While the debates are continuing, the Perpres has not been authorised up to the present time, more than the deadline previously mentioned (two years since the enactment of the law) by the Head of Anti-Terrorism Law Special Committee in the Indonesian legislative.

The gap and miscoordination amongst elements of counterterrorism become concerns faced in the field of counterterrorism (Briant, 2011; Campbell and Hartnett, 2005; Jonaityte and Warglien, 2020). The miscoordination is due to the differences in politics and attention (Jonaityte and Warglien, 2020; Kaplan 2008). Furthermore, agencies can be connected by “allocation of attention” (Cyert & March 1963); hence, organisational communication is suggested as it helps in increasing attention (Entman, 1993) and improving organisational focus on its own interests (Kaplan, 2008). Moreover, Jonaityte and Warglien (2020) highlight the importance of “cognitive coalitions” by an activation of organisational selective attentions. However, organisational selective attention has its disadvantages as it does not help the organisation understand rapid changes in their environment (Bansal et al., 2018; Chugh and Bazerman, 2007; Cyert & March 1963; Golman et al., 2017; Neisser 1979; Wilson et al., 2000). For example, as Zegart (2006) describes, the counterterrorism agencies did not respond as quickly as it required to avoid the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The adaptation failure, as Jonaityte and Warglien (2020) explain, originated in politics, and generated the consequence that the related agencies did not perform a quick response.

The earlier dispute on the definition of “*terrorism*” of the Indonesian Law No. May 2018 between academics and practitioners (in which academics try to specify the concept by putting the word “*radical*” into definition, while practitioners are not into detailed definition) shows the ongoing barriers between the government and academic communities (George, 1994; Jayakumar, 2019; Post and Ezekiel, 1998; Sageman, 2014; Wilson, 2007). A study by Bhimani and Song (2016) on humanitarian logistics on responses to terrorism demonstrates that there is a significant difference between needs in research and practice, hence it suggests capacity building, which includes sharing best practices. Moreover, Post and Ezekiel, 1998 study describes the cause of the barriers between academics and practitioners. They explain that in political terrorism, the momentum/time urgency of tackling the threat of violence becomes the priority of national security practitioners, whereas the sustainability/a long-range perspective is the priority of academics. Further, differences in missions, roles, and attitudes toward many issues put a gap between academics and practitioners (Post and Ezekiel, 1998). Post and Ezekiel, 1998 accordingly suggest exchanges of personnel as well as information and expanding the number of academic advisers in national security agencies with security clearances to narrow the gap. Sageman (2014) in his study about the stagnation in terrorism research due to the gap between academics and practitioners suggests opening non-sensitive data to academics and organising more effective dialogue between the academics and intelligence communities to achieve beneficial relationship and strengths in the two communities.

This study analyses how academics and national security practitioners can contribute to one another within counterterrorism efforts. It aims to identify existing and expected contributions of both communities in the field of counterterrorism. The study conducted systematic review on official documents of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) such as contracts and minutes of meetings. Participants from the government as well as several universities working on counterterrorism were involved in the study. The study may be useful in assisting academics and practitioners of counterterrorism in the development of the collaborative practices between both communities.

2. Methods

2.1. Participants

Participants involved in the FGD were twenty females between the age of 35 and 49: an assistant professor/academic of a university, six non-government humanitarian practitioners, and thirteen national security practitioners from several government agencies such as department of correction, the national anti-terrorism agency, intelligence departments, and religious affairs. The female participants were attending women’s role in CVE in Indonesia. Other than these females, 1400 participants were also observed on their comments or questions related to the role of academics and practitioners in counterterrorism. They were participants attended one of the following three events: 1. a nation-wide seminar on the role of Military Psychology in counterterrorism (two hundred participants), 2. a nationwide seminar on treatment for ISIS returnees from Syria and conflict areas (six hundred), and 3. an online talk-show on counterterrorism (six hundred). They were professionals (e.g. psychologist, criminologist), academics of multi-disciplinary, terrorism analysts, Human Rights activists, clerics, non-government legal practitioners, and national security practitioners in counterterrorism.

2.2. Procedure and material

The data of this study was collected prior to and during Covid-19 pandemic. Due to the lockdown of cities in Indonesia and restriction of access to offices of anti-terrorism agencies, this study used online communications, minutes of meetings, documents, and official presentations from distinguished speakers of CVE events as data. Information regarding the contributions of academics and national security practitioners was gathered from the following sources for conducting a systematic review: 1. FGD on females' role on CVE on February 19, 2020 at 3.00–6.00 p.m. in Jakarta, Indonesia, held by the researcher, 2. a dialogue in restricted online meetings using WhatsApp group and Zoom as a follow up of the FGD, held by the researcher, 3. two memorandum of understandings/MoUs on counterterrorism in 2019 and 2020 between two government agencies and academics from several universities, 4. a contract/agreement between an anti-terrorism agency and academics from several universities in 2013, 5. comments of audience at two seminars on December 18, 2019 and March 11, 2020 separately held by a psychological association and a university, 6. discussion at an online talk-show held by a psychological association on April 1, 2020, 7. three separate official presentations by three speakers: an associate professor from a university, a head of deradicalisation unit from an anti-terrorism agency, and a head of public relation unit from an anti-terrorism agency, and 8. official recommendations released by academics from the Centre of Terrorism Studies of University of Indonesia.

The FGD analysed in this study addressed three issues in counterterrorism: 1. each person/unit's experience and needs in treating female terrorist offenders and ISIS returnees coming from Syria, 2. best practices from different perspectives, 3. follow up, which are information sharing and collaboration, after FGD. The FGD was attended by national security practitioners (from an anti-terrorism agency and correction centres) and academics of Criminology, Psychology, and Islamic Studies. At the beginning the FGD explored about terrorism risk assessment and how to deradicalise offenders with different levels of religious radicalisation. Further, it discussed victims rehabilitation, the challenges on accepting foreign fighters and returnees from Syria and Iraq, capacity building for government officers, peaceful narratives on movies and social media, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in countering radicalisation, and the differences between ISIS and JI members profiling. The members of FGD suggested the making of WhatsApp group restricted only for members of the FGD to maintain communication and help future collaboration amongst practitioners and academics. The researcher gained approval to use the FGD, online meetings, minutes of meetings, and other documents for research purposes.

The dialogue at online meetings reviewed in this study explored the urgently needed partnership amongst academics of Psychology, psychologists, and national security practitioners on three subjects: treatment management to terrorist offenders, capacity building for officers in performing their daily tasks, and researches on rehabilitation inside prisons in Indonesia. The dialogue at these meetings then followed by the making of two MoUs. The first MoU set up the partnership mechanism in rehabilitation of offenders and training for officers. The second MoU stated about the making of radicalisation instruments in preventing extremism and coordination amongst all members involved in the project.

A contract in 2013, between an Anti-Terrorism Agency and academics from several universities, was assessed in this study. The contract arranged a list of rights and obligations of academics working to assist national security practitioners in the rehabilitation of offenders and treatment management for Afghanistan foreign fighters. One of these obligations was formulating the national guidelines for rehabilitating offenders and families. The contract also organised detailed coordination mechanism between academics and practitioners.

Two seminars were analysed in this study. The first seminar was on role of military in counterterrorism: pros and cons. The audience of this seminar were professors from several universities and government officers (e.g. army, police, special taskforce, and officers in correction centres). The topics discussed at this seminar ranged from Islamist radicalism to capacity building and certification of practitioners. The second seminar was on Indonesia's response to foreign fighters and returnees coming from conflict areas. The audience at this second seminar were professors and students of Terrorism Studies, legal practitioners, officers, analysts, Islamic clerics, and Human Rights activists. The issues discussed at the seminar ranged from trial process to humane treatments for women and children of ISIS.

A discussion at an online talk-show on Psychology of Terrorism held by the Indonesian Forensic Psychological Association (APSIFOR) was assessed in this study. The discussion was attended by chartered clinical and forensic psychologists, academics in Psychology, criminologists, national security officers, and researchers of multi-disciplinary. The discussion addressed a variety of issues such as deradicalisation, terrorism risk assessment, forensic methods in approaching offenders, and Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism.

Three separated official presentations by academics and practitioners in two seminars were examined in this study. The first presentation was made by an associate professor from a university who was formulating the national instrument for assessing radicalism in the country. The second presentation was made by the head of deradicalisation unit of an anti-terrorism agency. The third presentation was created by the head of public relation unit from an anti-terrorism agency. Lastly, official recommendations (policy briefs) released by a team of academics from a Centre of Terrorism Studies of a university as government think-tank were analysed in the study. The policy briefs were related to the role of military in counterterrorism and deradicalisation of terrorist offenders during and after pandemic.

2.3. Analysis

This study used qualitative text analysis on several sources. The sources were minutes of meetings of an FGD and online meetings, two MoUs between government agencies and academics, a contract between an anti-terrorism agency and academics, conversations of audience at two seminars and an online talk-show on counterterrorism, three official presentations, and two official policy briefs/

Table 1

Data sources for fifteen aspects of counterterrorism.

No	Aspect	Policy Briefs	1st MoU	2nd MoU	Talk-show	FGD	Online meeting	1st Seminar	2nd Seminar	Contract	1st Presentation	2nd Presentation	3rd Presentation
1.	Policy	✓			✓			✓	✓				✓
2.	Terrorism prevention			✓				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
3.	Terrorism risk assessment				✓	✓			✓				
4.	Coordination	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓			✓
5.	Prosecution	✓			✓			✓	✓				✓
6.	Rehabilitation of offenders and families	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
7.	Recovery of victims	✓				✓							✓
8.	Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			
9.	Capacity building for officers		✓			✓	✓	✓					
10.	Counter-narrative				✓	✓		✓	✓				
11.	The use of Artificial Intelligence				✓	✓		✓	✓				
12.	Terrorism networks				✓	✓		✓	✓				
13.	Trial process								✓				
14.	Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism				✓			✓					
15.	Terrorism financing				✓	✓		✓	✓				

recommendations released by academics from a Centre of Terrorism Studies.

The text analysis in this study showed fifteen key aspects in counterterrorism addressed by academics and practitioners. These key aspects were verified by six people: three academics of Terrorism Studies, a clinical psychologist working in counterterrorism, a bombing victim working in counterterrorism, and an expert staff of the House of Representatives specialised in the legal aspect of counterterrorism. The verification is for the content validity of the aspects (Table 1 and Fig. 1).

The aspects of *Policy* (e.g. Anti-Terrorism Bill, regulation, Presidential Decree), *Coordination* (e.g. police and military, military-civilian relations), and *Prosecution* (e.g. arrestment, operations), were addressed in two seminars, a talk-show on counterterrorism, an official presentation by the head of public relations of an anti-terrorism government agency, and the official policy briefs released by academics of Terrorism Studies. *Coordination* was also intensively discussed in the two MoUs and an agreement/contract. The discussions about the three aspects of *Policy*, *Coordination*, and *Prosecution* were related to the involvement of military stated in the revision of Indonesian Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. May 2018 on terrorism). The concern about the excessive use of hard approach by national security practitioners, Human Rights issue, and job-descriptions overlap between national law enforcement and military led to ongoing discussions, hence this aspect was frequently raised by participants in several events. Further, the aspect of *Recovery of victims* was raised in policy briefs by academics, FGD, and a presentation by the head of public relation of an anti-terrorism government agency, since the aspect was newly mentioned in the revision of the law on terrorism in the country.

The aspects of *Counter-narrative*, *the Use of AI*, *Terrorism networks*, and *Terrorism financing* were all discussed in FGD, seminars, and a talk-show; whilst *Trial process* was deeply discussed in a seminar held during the pandemic. Moreover, the aspect of *CBRN terrorism* was raised in a seminar and an online talk-show held during national lockdown. CBRN was explored due to audience's fear and speculation that Covid-19 is a type of bioterrorism. Other aspect, *Terrorism prevention*, was discussed in presentations by an academic and a head of deradicalisation department of an anti-terrorism agency, seminars, and an MoU. This aspect covers the detection of radicalism in all regions in Indonesia.

The aspect of *Terrorism risk assessment* was largely explored in a seminar, FGD, and a talk-show. The aspect includes individual profiling of terrorist offenders. Moreover, *Rehabilitation of terrorist offenders* inside and outside prisons (including re-education, disengagement, deradicalisation, and reintegration) was discussed in almost all CVE events and documents; whilst *Capacity building for government officers* were explored in great depth in an MoU, FGD, online meeting, and a seminar. Finally, *Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees* from Syria and other conflict areas was discussed in an MoU, FGD, online meeting, contract, and a seminar.

The study applied systematic reviews to all data in term of contributions of both academics and practitioners. The systematic review generated similarities and differences between contributions of the two communities in counterterrorism. Some similarities and differences are repeated continuously across each aspect; however, they are implemented differently throughout.

3. Results

The results of this study demonstrate fifteen major aspects of counterterrorism, which become a focus of discussions by both




Fig. 1. Fifteen aspects of counterterrorism validated by six academics and practitioners.

Table 2

Contributions of academics and national security practitioners in fifteen aspects of counterterrorism.

No	Aspect of Counterterrorism	Contributions		
		Similarities	Differences	
			Academics	National Security Practitioners
1	Policy	Formulating drafts of policy (e. g. Anti-Terrorism Bill, regulation, Presidential Decree) Collecting sources for policy drafting Measuring the effectiveness of public policy	Developing drafts of policy based on researches Presenting findings of researches on policies, to public as well as to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government Generating recommendations to practitioners related to policy practices and procedures (e.g. on Human Rights) Generating instruments/tools to measure the effectiveness of public policy based on systematic research	Developing drafts of policy based on experiences Presenting observable outcomes of policy implementation, to public as well as to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government Reviewing recommendations from academics regarding policy practices and procedures for feedback and improvement of performance
2	Terrorism prevention	Detecting radicalism in regions and individuals Collecting data Using resources to collect accurate data Measuring the effectiveness of prevention programs	Developing models of prevention based on researches Presenting findings of researches on prevention to public Presenting findings of researches on prevention to public Conducting researches on effective operations (including military ops) for terrorism prevention Generating recommendations to practitioners Generating instruments/tools to measure the effectiveness of prevention programs based on systematic research	Developing strategies for prevention based on experiences Presenting observable outcomes of their prevention efforts to public Conducting effective operations for terrorism prevention Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance Providing data
3	Terrorism risk assessment	Assessing risks in regions and individuals Collecting data Using resources to collect accurate data Presenting results of risk assessment Measuring the effectiveness of inter-agencies coordination	Developing risk assessment models based on systematic studies Generating recommendations to practitioners on methods Formulating user-friendly tools for risk assessment	Creating operating plans Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance Providing data
4	Coordination	Collecting data Using resources to collect accurate data Presenting results of coordination	Conducting researches on coordination and the roles of counterterrorism instruments (law enforcement, military, diplomacy, intelligence) Developing models of coordination inter-agencies based on researches Generating recommendations to practitioners Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of coordination based on systematic research	Conducting effective coordination inter-agencies Developing strategies for effective inter-agencies coordination based on experiences Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance Providing data
5	Prosecution	Measuring the effectiveness of prosecutions Collecting data Using resources to collect accurate data Presenting findings on prosecution Collecting data	Developing models of prosecution based on researches Generating recommendations to practitioners Conducting researches on effective prosecutions in counterterrorism Generating instruments to measure the effectiveness of approaches	Managing effective approaches Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
6	Rehabilitation of terrorist offenders and families	Using resources to collect accurate data	Developing models of treatment management to offenders, based on researches Conducting researches on effective rehabilitation	Formulating strategies for rehabilitation Managing effective rehabilitation

(continued on next page)

Table 2 (continued)

No	Aspect of Counterterrorism	Contributions		
		Similarities	Differences	
			Academics	National Security Practitioners
7	Recovery of victims	Measuring the effectiveness of rehabilitation	Generating recommendations to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Presenting findings on rehabilitation and deradicalisation	Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of rehabilitation	Providing data
		Collecting data	Building models of recovery management to victims	Managing strategies for recovery to victims
		Using resources to collect accurate data	Conducting researches on recovery to victims	Executing effective recovery to victims
		Measuring the effectiveness of recovery programs to victims	Generating recommendations to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
8	Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees	Presenting findings on recovery of victims	Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of recovery to victims	Providing data
		Collecting data	Developing models of treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees, based on researches	Improving strategies for treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees
		Using resources to collect accurate data	Conducting researches on effective treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees	Conducting effective treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees
		Measuring the effectiveness of treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees	Generating recommendations to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Presenting findings about treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees	Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of treatment management to foreign fighters and returnees based on systematic research	Providing data
9	Capacity building for officers	Training officers	Developing models of capacity building for officers based on research and expertise	Developing strategies for capacity building based on experiences
		Collecting resources for capacity building	Conducting researches on officers' capacity	Providing data
		Assessing officers' capacity	Generating recommendations to practitioners based on researches	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Developing program of study and curriculum for officers	Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of capacity building	Organising capacity building to officers
		Evaluating capacity building for officers		
10	Counter-narrative	Presenting findings on capacity building		
		Collecting data	Developing models of counternarrative, based on researches	Developing strategies for counternarrative, based on experiences
		Using resources to collect accurate data	Conducting researches on counternarrative	Conducting effective counternarrative
		Measuring the effectiveness of counternarrative	Generating recommendations to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Presenting findings on counternarrative	Generating tools to measure the effectiveness of counternarrative based on systematic research	
11	The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)	Using AI	Conducting researches on the impact of AI in the field of Terrorism (e.g. related to ethics, Human Rights)	Building software and hardware in the field of Terrorism
		Collecting resource from AI	Generating recommendations (e.g. ethical guidelines and effective use of AI) to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Measuring the effectiveness of AI in counterterrorism		
		Measuring the effect of AI to terrorism actions		
		Measuring the effect of AI in radicalisation		
		Developing Big Data on terrorist offenders' profiles and their networks		

(continued on next page)

Table 2 (continued)

No	Aspect of Counterterrorism	Contributions		
		Similarities	Differences	
			Academics	National Security Practitioners
12	Terrorism networks	Presenting findings of researches on AI and Terrorism, to public		
		Collecting data	Conducting studies on terrorism networks	Conducting surveillance on terrorism networks
13	Trial process	Using resources to collect accurate data	Generating recommendations to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Reviewing terrorism networks		
		Presenting findings on terrorism networks to public		
		Collecting data	Developing mechanisms for trials	Gathering forensic evidence for terrorism cases
14	Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism	Collecting resource from accurate data	Presenting in court as experts or researchers	Presenting evidence in court, as government representatives
		Reviewing terrorism cases	Generating recommendations for practitioners to help resolve terrorism cases being on trial	Reviewing recommendations from academics for making decisions or solving terrorism cases
		Attending court session		
		Collecting data	Conducting researches on CBRN terrorism and counterterrorism	Managing resources for CBRN counterterrorism
		Collecting resource from accurate data	Generating recommendations (e.g. ethical guidelines and effective use of CBRN counterterrorism) to practitioners	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Measuring the effectiveness of CBRN counterterrorism		
15	Terrorism financing	Developing apparatus for CBRN counterterrorism		
		Developing models for CBRN counterterrorism		
		Presenting findings on CBRN counterterrorism		
		Collecting data	Conducting researches on terrorism financing	Monitoring to prevent terrorism financing
		Collecting resource from accurate data	Generating recommendations to intervene terrorism financing	Reviewing recommendations from academics for feedback and improvement of performance
		Presenting findings on terrorism financing		

national security practitioners and academics in Indonesia. In all aspects, as seen in Table 2, both communities work together and perform similar activities. The study shows that generally, academics are expected to make recommendations to practitioners based on their researches and theories, whereas practitioners are expected to review these recommendations in performing their tasks for feedback and improvement of performance. Moreover, the study indicates that there are several similarities and differences of contributions between academics and practitioners in the fifteen different aspects.

In the aspect of *Policy*, both academics and national security practitioners collect sources for policy drafting, formulate the drafts of policy (e.g. the Anti-Terrorism Bill, regulations, and Presidential Decree), and measure the effectiveness of public policies after they are implemented. This has been practiced during the formulation of the new Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia where both communities (academics and practitioners) contributed several paragraphs for the Law. The legislative subsequently reviewed and examined the paragraphs to be official Articles of the new Anti-Terrorism Law. Furthermore, in terms of differences, academics contributed to drafting the policy based on systematic research, while practitioners contributed in the same matter based on their first-hand experience. In this aspect of policy making, academics are expected to conduct systematic researches on policies and present the findings to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, whereas practitioners are asked to demonstrate observable outcomes of the policies responding to the academics' findings. Moreover, academics are often asked to construct tools to measure the effectiveness of policies in which the legislative and executive have made; the tools which would be useful for practitioners for future use.

In the aspect of *Terrorism prevention*, both academics and practitioners contribute in collecting accurate data to identify threats and extremism/radicalism in regions across country. Both are measuring the effectiveness of prevention programs developed by the national anti-terrorism agency. Moreover, academics assist practitioners in developing terrorism prevention models based on reliable methodology, while practitioners expand terrorism prevention operating strategies. Since terrorism prevention also includes military operations, such as propaganda for nationalism and patriotism, re-education, winning people's heart and mind, academics are performing research on these operations and their effectiveness. The academics suggested the sampling methods to the national anti-terrorism agencies in holding longitudinal national-scaled researches. Academics also produce measurement tools (instruments) to

support their assessments which may be adopted by practitioners for evaluation and future improvement. These instruments are based on the country's philosophy, Pancasila. Practitioners, on the other hand, are expected to provide data to support academics. Practitioners are also expected to present their accountability and reliability through satisfying measurable outcomes of their prevention programs.

In the aspect of *Terrorism risk assessment*, academics and practitioners are collecting data from their sources and assessing risks in both macro (e.g. regions of the country) and micro (individuals) levels. At individual level, the risk assessments consist of examinations/profiling of ideology, motivations, and capabilities of terrorist offenders (e.g. intelligence, military, language, cyber, mechanical, and electronic skills). Academics are asked to assist government in developing terrorism risk-assessment models and user-friendly tools helpful for practitioners through studies, while practitioners make the data available for formulating these tools and conducting these studies. The findings indicate that both communities agreed not to use any risk assessments made by foreigners to embrace Indonesian culture, hence they develop their own instruments and are expected to present the results of these risk assessments. Furthermore, the user-friendly tools are seen to be an issue discussed in the CVE events covered in this study. This is due to the fact that the tools generated by the academics are not easily applied according to the practitioners working with terrorist offenders in their daily basis. For example, some tools require practitioners to combine the data of offenders from different agencies (become Big Data), while these agencies do not always collaborate with each other. The practitioners accordingly develop their own measurement system, which are simpler or only using their daily experience such as classifying terrorists into "cooperative vs non cooperative". This measurement system is then utilised by the academics to support the validation of the tools they have made. The practitioners are also creating operating plans to conduct the risk assessments (e.g. prisons, islands, cities to be prioritised for risk assessment).

The aspect of *Coordination* has been largely explored in CVE events and documents as the issue of coordination becomes a deep concern of several counterterrorism stakeholders. The issue of coordination includes police and military cooperation as well as civil and government officers' relations. These issues are highly controversial in the country, which have created ongoing debates. The audience of two seminars expressed their opinions stating that coordination is simpler to be planned than implemented. In terms of similarities of contributions between academics and practitioners, both communities measure the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination and present the results to the public. Coordination and collaboration amongst agencies are primarily conducted and managed by national security practitioners. However, academics may conduct studies on the roles of counterterrorism instruments: diplomacy, law enforcement, military, and intelligence. They can propose models of inter-agency coordination and create tools to evaluate the effectiveness of these coordination's, while practitioners make practical schemes (e.g. how to shift the custody of terrorist offenders from military to police) for successful inter-bureaus harmonisation.

Similar to *Coordination*, the aspect of *Prosecution* has been deeply discussed in CVE seminars, meetings and documents as it is closely related to hard approaches, Human Rights issues, and coordination amongst organisations. This aspect includes physical contacts with offenders, interrogation, surveillance, arrestment, and military operations to terrorism networks. Both academics and practitioners contribute to measure the effectiveness of prosecutions based on legitimate data and presenting the outcomes of prosecution process to public. The satisfying outcomes of prosecution would be effective approaches of interrogation, surveillance, and arrestments, that they avoid Human Rights violation and broader reaction such as community protest on streets. Prosecution is mainly managed and executed by national security practitioners; nonetheless, academics are asked to produce research on this aspect and reliable instruments to measure the efficiency of prosecution. Academics are frequently expected to help the government design models of effective prosecutions.

The aspect of *Rehabilitation of offenders* has been discussed repeatedly in many CVE events, FGD, MoUs, and contract. It includes all terms of rehabilitation such as disengagement, deradicalisation, resocialisation, reintegration, re-education, empowerment, and advocacy to terrorist offenders and families. The aspect becomes a great concern of all communities (e.g. practitioners, academics, bombing victims, former offenders, and politicians) as debates are still continuing to discuss deradicalisation versus disengagement, parameters of success, monetary and efficiency, recidivism, and inequality in compared to recovery for victims. Both academics and practitioners are actively contributing to collect data in measuring the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs and present their findings to public, including media, to demonstrate government's efficacy in managing treatment to offenders. Furthermore, preferring to construct 'more local and cultural' techniques in approaching offenders, Indonesian academics in Psychology, Criminology, and Public Policy help practitioners in building Indonesian terrorism rehabilitation models, while practitioners set up a rehabilitation blueprint and working strategies. Recidivism, funding for rehabilitation, and even dependency of former terrorist offenders to therapists and staffs become real issues faced by practitioners, thus academics are frequently asked to conduct researches on these issues. Many academics created instruments for their assessments of treatment management to offenders and expect to be implemented by practitioners for evaluation and advancement of programs. Practitioners, on the other hand, are asked to make data available for these efforts.

The aspect of *Recovery of victims* has been intensively raised in FGD and documents since the aspect is mentioned in the revision of Anti-Terrorism Law. The study demonstrates that academics, practitioners, and bombing victims have raised their concern that the real implementation of this new idea (recovery of victims) is unclear. In addressing this aspect, both academics and practitioners are asked to help in assessing the effectiveness of recovery programs for victims after Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are set out. This is by gathering accurate information related to numbers of victims being treated, the successfulness of victims' empowerment programs, and victims' satisfaction. Academics and practitioners are asked to present the findings of their assessment to the public to examine the government's accountability in tackling the issue of victims' treatment, since practitioners mainly manage and execute the programs. Furthermore, academics are performing research, building models for effective recovery programs, and formulating tools for assessments, whereas practitioners are providing beneficial information.

The aspect of *Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees* coming from Syria and other conflict areas has been a focus of

debates in many current CVE events. Similar to the discussion of the aspect of *Rehabilitation of offenders, Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees* was raised due a significant worry amongst national defense practitioners and broader society. The concerns are linked to the nation's sovereignty and approval, the mitigation of risks and threats, citizenship behaviour, the process of reintegration and its challenges, and the officers' capacity. Academics and practitioners are collecting data to measure the success of treatment to foreign fighters and returnees and present their findings. Academics in International Relation, Criminology, and Public Policy Studies help practitioners construct treatment management and government practitioners plan operational strategies. Current programs have segregated treatments to male, female, and children. The treatments are administered by several governmental agencies. Academics are conducting research on these matters. Academics also generate apparatus of their evaluation helpful for practitioners. The practitioners are suitably making data available for this evaluation.

The issue of *Capacity building for officers* is related to all issues in counterterrorism itself (e.g. prevention, prosecution, rehabilitation, treatment management for foreign fighters, recovery of victims), so the aspect is reviewed independently in this study. The aspect of capacity building becomes a topic of discussion in seminars, MoUs, and FGD as it is considered to be urgently needed in the country. One of the causes of the lack of capacity is mostly due to the recurrent rotations and promotions of officers. In addressing this aspect, both academics and practitioners are currently contributing simultaneously in training officers, collecting resources for these trainings, assessing officers' capacity continually, developing program of study and curriculum/syllabus for officers, evaluating the results of capacity building for officers, and presenting findings on capacity building. Academics in multi-disciplinary studies accordingly establish learning models for practitioners, such as arranging several schools of Terrorism Studies for practitioners to pursue post-graduate degrees. Academics are also conducting research in the capacity of counterterrorism officers, build areas of competencies to be developed, and generate tests to evaluate the progress of learning. Practitioners, on the other hand, are building strategies for capacity building (e.g. prioritising talented officers, setting up learning certifications as requirements for promotion), providing data for learning programs of officers (e.g. areas of development, competencies needed), and organising the whole process of capacity building (e.g. giving scholarship to officers).

The aspect of Counter-narrative includes delivering peaceful campaigns and education through movies (e.g. "Jihad Selfie", "Seeking The Imam", and "The Cubs of the Caliphate"), radio shows, seminars/talk-shows, advertisements (e.g. on cinema, streets), news (e.g. news television), social media (e.g. YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook), and communication applications (e.g. WhatsApp and Telegram groups). In addressing this aspect, both academics and practitioners are collecting a large information about this activity, measuring the effectiveness, and presenting the findings about its effectiveness to public with different arguments. Academics conduct workshops to socialise effective approaches of counter-narratives, demonstrate researches, and create instruments helpful for practitioners in monetary loss-benefits calculation. For example, counter-narrative in cinemas before a commercial movie begins, explained by academics in FGD, are less effective than "Jihad Selfie" counterradicalism movie. The movie gained attention from many people particularly the millennials who were considering about joining ISIS. The movie is seen to be an effective counter-narrative as it shows the risks of going to an 'uncertain' place and situation, therefore preventing people from departing to Syria and Iraq. Another example of an effective method, explained by academics, is 'bombarded peaceful campaign' on Facebook. Academics convinced practitioners of government sector in the FGD that continuous peaceful messages on Facebook will block hate speeches from entering individuals' algorithm, hence they do not appear in people's newsfeeds. The academics' valuable feedback and perspectives are taken into account by the national Anti-Terrorism Agency to plan techniques, examine, upgrade their existing programs, and organise counter-narrative in more effective ways.

The aspect of *the Use of AI* has often been discussed in several counterterrorism forums. The aspect becomes a focus of concern of both academics and practitioners due to its substantial correlation with ISIS propaganda in social media, cyber trainings on bomb-making by terrorist networks, lone-wolf radicalisation, hate-speeches screening, and 'tapping-vs-privacy' controversy. In terms of contribution, both academic and practitioner communities are using AI to collect information, observe terrorist network activities, and measure numerous mechanisms. Measures include the impact of AI on terrorism real actions as well as extremism (e.g. facilitating bomb-making learning, catalysing the radicalisation of lone-wolf) and the effectiveness of AI in countering terrorism (e.g. the impact of inserting peaceful messages to personalise the algorithms of potentially radical people in social media platforms). Both communities are developing Big Data on terrorist offenders' profiles and their networks and presenting these findings to the government agencies specialised in cyberterrorism. In terms of difference in addressing this aspect, academics are currently conducting researches on AI, its impact to the field of Terrorism, accuracy of data, and the ethics-related issues (e.g. privacy protection, freedom of speech, and Human Rights violation); whereas practitioners are actively building software and hardware for counterterrorism.

Terrorism networks have been frequently discussed in CVE events even during the pandemic. The discussions of this aspect contain the distinctions between ISIS and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in term of their networks, structures, and typology of members; thus, different treatments to these networks are suggested. ISIS' networks are seen by both communities as exploiting social media robustly, yet less organised, compared to JI's. ISIS members are also considered to be younger, more emotional, seeking short-term sensational goals, sporadic in their actions, and looking for more 'prestigious empowerment programs' of rehabilitation, compared to the JI's. Academics have convinced government practitioners that empowering former members of ISIS during rehabilitation by offering jobs as waiters in several restaurants in Indonesia is not recommended as the evidence show that they are less committed in comparison to former members of JI. When ISIS former members are offered to run a startup business, become bloggers/writers of published books, and seek higher education (through scholarships), they are found to be more enthusiastic and show sustainability in their tasks. Thus, government rehabilitation programs are distinct between ISIS and JI members.

The discussion of the aspect of *Terrorism networks* were more activated during the Covid-19 pandemic on a variety of events such as seminars, a talk-show, and FGD. It is because of the various current narratives available in social media platforms (including hoax) throughout the lockdown and the significant increase of cyber activities in terrorism networks. The narratives are persistently stating

several types of arguments, such as: 1. that the pandemic is God's soldiers to punish China for their treatment to Uyghur people, 2. the pandemic is human-made and aimed to systematically separate believers from places of worship, and 3. the pandemic is an early sign of the world chaos and apocalypse ('*ad-dukhon*') before the real caliphate is formed. These narratives have stimulated some terrorism actions in Indonesia at the same time during pandemic. Even though both academics and practitioners are actively identifying terrorism networks in grassroots, national security practitioners are not as open as academics in terms of sharing information to the general public due to their code of conduct as well as professional bond.

The aspect of *Trial process* in terrorism cases has been deeply discussed in a seminar relevant to the use of 'trial in absentia' for foreign fighters worldwide. Whilst examining all information regarding Indonesian returnees given by immigration officials and reviewing international laws on foreign fighters, academics in International Relation Studies are proposing certain mechanisms on trials. The certain mechanisms include the idea that terrorist convicts originating from Syria or any conflict areas do not need to present themselves in the trials held for their cases ('in absentia'), due to the lack of forensic evidence. Hence, they can be arrested immediately after returning home. Human Rights practitioners, on the other hand, disagree with this idea as they are concerned with potential abuse of powers. Throughout trials, academics are requested to present as experts, testifying for or against the terrorism convicts based on their expertise and various researches on the case. National security practitioners accordingly present evidence obtained from Syria/overseas to state their arguments regarding the convicts.

Aspect of *CBRN terrorism* was considered in CVE events due to the extreme dangerousness of its effects. The use of CBRN becomes a focus of discussions in several events, particularly during a pandemic, as JI members have claimed that they are able to formulate the weapons. The emergence of New JI networks and their capabilities on CBRN therefore become the issues analysed by academics and practitioners. Both communities collect resources and present their findings on the issue of CBRN terrorism, such as the potential use of glycerin and the anthrax virus in terror acts. Some former JI members, acting as consultants, also shared their knowledge about CBRN formulas which they have learnt in terrorism camps. Academics and practitioners are working together in developing models and apparatus, to counter the weapons, as well as measuring their effectiveness.

The last aspect of counterterrorism analysed in this study is *Terrorism financing*. This aspect has been discussed intensively in many CVE events since the stakeholders were aware of the abuse of financial methods for managing terror attacks. The issues as of terrorism financing operates in 'nonreligious-motivated' businesses and its association to money laundering concern many stakeholders. These stakeholders include government officials, entrepreneurs, investors, business professionals, and academics. Another worrying issue, global fund supplying to national terrorist networks, encourages all counterterrorism communities work together to solve the problem. Academics in Criminology and Economics Studies conduct researches on the terrorism financial activities by reviewing financial documents, whereas law enforcement/financial security practitioners actively monitor terrorist networks, through surveillance, in order to prevent any terror actions. Both contribute to present their findings to the higher government officials and even to the legislative in disciplinary meetings and hearings. Consequently, some policies were made, such as banning certain social organisations which are significantly related to radical networks, limiting daily banking transfer, setting a new limit for purchase foreign currency, and prohibiting cash supply to former terrorist offenders and families.

4. Discussion

The development of the Anti-Terrorism Law in Indonesia intensifies conversations surrounding the relationship of all the country's instruments of counterterrorism for harmonisation. The new law also stimulates discussions regarding the important role of academics and practitioners in counterterrorism efforts along with how to bridge the gap amongst government apparatus. This paper seeks to analyse existing and upcoming contributions of academics as well as national security practitioners in Indonesian counterterrorism. Indonesia's experience in managing religious-motivated terrorism with approximately two hundred twenty-nine million Muslim population (61.7% of all Muslim population worldwide) is important to be recorded; therefore, this study was held. Nonetheless, the study may be useful in helping academics and practitioners of counterterrorism around the globe set out collaboration between the two communities.

Conducted in the time of the Covid-19 pandemic, the study administered systematic review and text analysis to minutes of meetings and documents of CVE. The results show that there are fifteen different aspects in counterterrorism which become the main concern of academics and practitioners in Indonesia. Both communities address these aspects by working together to overcome issues. The first aspect is *Policy*. This aspect includes the making of the Anti-Terrorism Bill prior to the official revision of the law on terrorism, several technical regulations (as derivatives of the Anti-Terrorism Law), and Presidential Decrees. The second is *Coordination*. This aspect covers cooperation mechanism between government apparatus, such as law enforcement and the military. The third is *Prosecution*, which is defined as physical contact/operations to offenders, such as arrestment.

The fourth aspect addressed by counterterrorism stakeholders in Indonesia is *Recovery of victims*, which is newly mentioned in the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law. This aspect involves physical and psychological treatment for bombing victims. The fifth and sixth aspects are *Terrorism prevention* and *Terrorism risk assessment*. These aspects have led to discussion about the appropriate instruments in measuring early signs of radicalism in a community or an individual. The seventh is *Counter-narrative*, which mainly covers peaceful campaigns in social media platforms to prevent extremism. The eighth is *Terrorism networks* in which comprises the distinctive between ISIS and other networks such as JI and its affiliations.

The ninth aspect found in this study is *Terrorism financing*. The aspect is associated with money laundering and it involves many components of society, such as investors, entrepreneurs, and finance professionals, to tackle the issue. The tenth and eleventh are *the Use of AI* and *CBRN*, along with the controversies of their functions. The debates about the pros and cons of AI for humans and the extraordinary effect of CBRN concern all counterparts of counterterrorism. The discussions about these themes were also linked to

Covid-19 pandemic, the increase use of cyber-space during lockdown, and a speculation arguing that the virus was a form of bioterrorism.

The twelfth aspect in the findings of this study is *Trial process*, which is the use of trial-in-absentia for returnees and foreign fighters coming from Syria and Iraq. Academics of International Relation and Criminology Studies argue on the possibility to apply trial in absentia to foreign fighters. The thirteenth and fourteenth are *Rehabilitation of terrorist offenders* and *Treatment management for foreign fighters and returnees*. These aspects include the effective approaches and methods to terrorist offenders both inside as well as outside prisons. The aspects are frequently referred to several terms such as 're-education', 'disengagement', 'deradicalisation', 'aftercare', and 'reintegration'. The final aspect is *Capacity building for government officers* in which is regarded by all stakeholders in counterterrorism as urgently crucial.

The findings in this study explain that both academic and practitioner communities contribute simultaneously to the fifteen aspects of terrorism. Moreover, they often work together in the aspects of counterterrorism. This finding supports the study by [Harris-Hogan et al. \(2015\)](#) showing that academics and practitioners have generally been involved in terrorism prevention activities, especially the ones aimed to avoid recidivism of the hardcore offenders.

The study demonstrates that in their endeavours to achieve harmonisation on counterterrorism works, both communities generate similarities and differences of contributions in each aspect of counterterrorism. Academics formulate theoretical models in counterterrorism based on their researches, valid instruments for planning and evaluation, appropriate research methodologies, and recommendations. On the other hand, national security practitioners build counterterrorism strategies and successfully manage resources, appropriate treatments to terrorist offenders, stability of interventions as well as improvement.

These findings are subject to some limitations. The first limitation lies in the generalisability of the findings in this study. As the study was conducted in Indonesia and stimulated by the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law, the aspects discussed were linked to the enactment of the new law and the practical adjustments of this law. Moreover, Indonesian cultural differences, in comparison to other cultures, may portray a distinct style of inter-agency communication ([Boyle, 1998](#); [French et al., 2005](#); [Haar and Krahé, 1999](#); [Mangundjaya and Beatson, 2013](#); [Nilan and Demartoto, 2012](#)), such as avoiding open confrontation and valuing seniority. The second limitation is that the study does not elaborate any disconnection, miscommunication, or dispute between academics and practitioners through their contributions in counterterrorism aspects (see [Feddes and Gallucci, 2015](#); [Koehler and Fiebig, 2019](#)). Any conflicting data (i.e. of terrorist criminal profiling, forensic evidence), problems in synchronisation (i.e. inconsistency, commitment issues, absence of meetings), and a reluctance to share or to change (i.e. regarding Big Data, information of cases, strategies, and programs) are not discovered in the study.

Collaboration and gaps of perspectives between practitioners (governmental and non-governmental) and academic communities have been discussed throughout many researches, not only in counterterrorism but also in other studies ([Cohen, 2007](#); [Grimsey and Lewis, 2005](#); [Rynes et al., 2007](#); [Shepherd and Mathews, 2000](#)). Communication issues amongst organisations (e.g. public sector, universities) in response to a rapid change are also captured in all fields of study. A study of Economics by [Kellogg et al. \(2006\)](#) describes that members of different communities (e.g. academics, practitioners) tend to demonstrate boundary-spanning coordination in the circumstances which require high speed, uncertainty, and rapid change; therefore the study suggests that the members of the coordination practices make their work visible and legible to each other. The study also suggests the members involved in the coordination facilitate ongoing revision and alignment. The study found that coordination does not eradicate jurisdictional conflicts; in fact, it frequently creates problematic consequences, such as the favoring of speed over quality, repression of difference, loss of understanding, misinterpretation and vagueness, rework, and temporal tension. Another study by [Kapucu \(2006\)](#) on the prevention of disaster, taking example of the 9/11 WTC attack, articulates the importance of a strong communication system among public, private, and non-profit organisations before a disaster occurs, in order to establish successful inter-agency coordination. The study describes the lack of effective inter-agency communication and the important role of technology in achieving effective communication and decisions throughout emergencies. Further, [Bouckaert et al. \(2010\)](#) in their book describe a range of patterns in the dynamics of specialisation and coordination by public sector bodies to face challenges and adjust throughout the years.

Further studies on several related issues, such as the challenges of cooperation between academics and national security practitioners, how they can be overcome, and how this cooperation are enhanced in the future, are essentially needed. It is also important to identify the circumstances in which academics and national security practitioners are recommended or not recommended to collaborate. Moreover, beneficial collaboration between the two communities in other aspects of counterterrorism, beyond the aspects analysed in this study, is necessary.

Funding

No funding was reported by the author.

Ethical approval

This article does not contain any studies with animals performed by the author. All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Informed consent

Informed consent was obtained from all participants included in the study.

Declaration of competing interest

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcrj.2021.100467>.

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